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Abstract: The aim of the article is to understand how the drivers for investment decisions in the capacities of 
electricity production have evolved over time, from 1945 to the present day, in the specific context of Europe facing 
wars and conflicts, scientific and technological progress, strong political and academic developments. 
We study the electric investment decisions by comparing the history of the European electricity markets with the 
successively dominant economic theories in this field. Therefore, we highlight differences between rational 
behaviors, such as described by the theories, and actual behaviors of investors and governments. Thus the 
liberalization of electricity markets in the European Union, more than twenty-five years ago, parts of a 
rationalization prescribed by new economic theories. It is clear that liberalization is being discussed. First, it remains 
very heterogeneous, which complicates the goal of creating a large single market for electricity in the Union. 
Second, we see a recent re-centralization of energy policy in the European Union (EU), which takes the form of a 
new regulation mainly relating to climate and renewables. However, this re-regulation is different from centralized 
control experienced by all European electricity markets until the mid-1980s. 
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1. Introduction 
The article addresses the issue of investment in electricity generation capacities in Europe from 1945 to 
the present day through an approach both theoretical and historical. Over this period, the drivers for 
investment decisions have evolved in the context of Europe facing wars and conflicts, scientific and 
technological progress, strong political and academic developments. Today, electricity investment is 
subject to new mutations, due to the still ongoing process of European market liberalization and the recent 
breakthrough of climate change issue, the latter imposing to reduce greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions, in 
particular through planned integration of renewables in the generation mix. 
Over the considered period, we will compare the economic theories of the time to the actual decisions 
that were made, in order to shed light on the differences between the rational behavior described by theory 
and the actual behaviors of companies and governments. Of course, the generation mix of a state is, in the 
end, determined by the investment decisions of electricity companies. However, these decisions are 
influenced by many exogenous factors and follow drivers that are very different according to historical and 
geographical context. 
What were the main drivers for investors’ decisions on European electricity markets? How did they 
evolve with time? What are the results of the liberalization process? What are the new stakes regarding 
regulation? How would they influence the liberalization process itself? We will answer these questions 
based on the experience of the five countries representing 65% of EU27 electricity generation: France, 
Germany, United Kingdom, Spain and Italy. 
 
What are the main results of this paper? First, it should be acknowledged that the liberalization process 
initated in the EU about 25 years ago parts of a rationalization prescribed by economic theories of the 
1980s and 90s. Morevoer, it is now clear that this liberalization is being questioned. It has indeed given 
heterogenous results regarding market structure, prices or power quality (i.e. continuity in production and 
sufficient generation). One can also notice a recent re-centralization of energy policy, in the form of new 
regulation regarding climate and renewables, and of programmed investments in grid interconnections for 
EU member countries. This re-regulation is very different from the centralized driving Europe used to 
know until the 1980s, since it does not question the liberalization process per se. It aims at allowing heavy 
investments and providing more support to the electricity market for instance through new taxation tools 
(carbon tax, research and development subsidies…) aiming at internalizing external effects. 
  
 In the end, two main historical periods single out and structure the article: 
- The 1945-1986 period (Section 2), during which national generation mix get formed in European 
countries, according to considerations often in contradiction with one another such as economic 
optimization, priviledging local resources, Ramsey-Boiteux rule, etc.; 
- The 1986-2013 period (Section 3), marked by important mutations: the objective of liberalizing the 
electricity sector ending up in different degrees of competition in EU countries; new climate stakes 
and recent development of renewables. 
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2. 1945-1986, from European reconstruction to oil shocks: a crucial period for the 
constitution of current power generation mix 
a. Nationalization or integrated model? 
In a post-war context, the first goal of European countries is reconstruction. For the electricity sector, 
the priority is thus to go back to previous levels of generation as soon as possible. In order to do so, 
governments take measures that end up with giving them an increased control on the electricity sector. 
In France, nationalization of power company is voted in 1946, which leads to the creation of 
Electricité de France (EDF) (Beltran and Bungener, 1987). In the United Kingdom, nationalization is 
also decided according to the Electricity Act voted in 1947. The British Energy Authority is created in 
1948 and becomes Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) in 1957 (Grand and Veyrenc, 2011). 
Italy also chooses to nationalize the electricity sector in the Constitution in 1946, but national operator 
Enel is created only in 1962 (Grand and Veyrenc, 2011) due to industrial reluctance in the sector: 
nationalization indeed means that Enel has to absorb the 1270 historical power operators. The processus 
will be completed in 1995 (Enel website). In these three countries, the electricity sector has thus become 
a state monopole. Governments have direct control over tarification and technology choices. 
 
 The situation in Germany and Spain is different: they do not create state monopolies nor centralized 
planning (Grand and Veyrenc, 2011; Ibeas Cubillo, 2011). Their electricity industry corresponds to an 
integrated model. The German electricity sector keeps its structure including local and regional companies, 
due to the particular structure of federal German state itself – being divided in powerful Länder. Yet the 
sector is very integrated on both vertical and horizontal scales through numerous exclusivity contracts 
between power generators and grids, generators and distributors, but also from generator to generator. In 
the end the electricity sector in Germany is not submitted to competition and the 1935 Energy Act controls 
prices indirectly. Technology choices are adopted at a federal level.  
In Spain, electricity sector integration happens through the coordination of private companies by 
themselves (Ibeas Cubillo, 2011). In 1944, 18 electricity companies create the Asociación Española de 
l’Industria Electrica (UNESA), in order to promote a real national electricity grid by developing more 
interconnections to ensure better supply (Asociasion espanola de la industria Electrica, 2013). Like in 
Germany, the Spanish government controls prices indirectly through the Unified limited rates system 
established in 1951 that sets maximum prices and regular tariff harmonization in the differents areas of the 
country. 
 
European states thus take control of the power industry either through a monopoly called “natural 
monopole” by economic theory, either through an integrated model where potential entrants and prices are 
influenced by the state. 
 
b. Cost-Benefit Analysis: the dominant economic theory over the period 
In the aftermath of World War II, the Cost-Benefit Analysis is the dominant theory regarding electricity 
investment all over Europe. It justifies and supports the settling of monopoles and integrated markets. This 
theory was issued by works of marginalist economists and stems from the Welfare Economics founded in 
the 1930s and 1940s by Allais (1943), Hicks (1939), Pigou (1924), and Samuelson (1943). In the 1950s, 
the Cost-Benefit Analysis is initiated in France and other European countries by Massé (1953) and Boiteux 
(1956). This analysis implies assessing in an explicit way the total expected costs and total expected 
benefits for one or several electricity investment projects, in order to determine which one is the best or the 
most profitable.
1
 
Technically, electricity supply at the time relies on two technologies: hydroelectric plants and thermal 
plants. Debates on the profitability of both technologies lead to important conceptual breakthrough, in 
                                                            
1
 The first optimization model based on Cost-Benefit Analysis was developed in 1955. Massé said at the time: “The electricity industry has found a purel 
objective tool in order to take investment decisions withtout personal bias”, Beltran and Bungener (1987). 
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particular regarding complete cost assessment of a technology (including the lifecycle analysis for the 
facility), choice of a relevant discount rate, and ability of the supply to ensure peak consumption. 
 
Power generation is per se capital-intensive due to grid and plant investments that are needed. This is 
why Cost-Benefit Analysis comes along with integrated markets or monopoles, the latters being called 
natural according to the Ramsey-Boiteux rule. This rule demonstrates that a company with initial fixed 
costs (as in the electricity sector) undergoes losses if its price is equal to marginal cost (perfect 
competition); whereas in a natural monopole, it can reach equilibrium thanks to second order pricing 
superior to marginal cost and inversely proportional to demand elasticity (Boiteux, 1956). 
 
c. The lack of risk and uncertainty assessment in Cost-Benefit analysis 
In Massé’s works for optimal electricity investment determination, the main risks at stake are discussed. 
It is yet clear that they are not enough integrated in the modelling or only in a very limited way (Massé, 
1953).
2
 
It is after the Suez crisis in 1956
3
 (Chick, 2007) that the first lacks of Cost-Benefit analysis are clearly 
identified. Indeed, exogenous risks like supply risk on imported oil like in the Suez crisis and its cascading 
effects are not correctly anticipated in this theory (Denant-Boèmont and Raux 1998; Massé 1953).  
Economic theories on risk are nevertheless developed at the same time. In the 1940s and 1950s, 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and Friedman and Savage (1948) address the issue of decision maker’s 
rationality when confronted to the risks at stake.4 This progress is however exluded from marginalist 
modelling for electricity investment. 
 
d. The initial competition between oil and coal 
Oil and coal are the two main resources at the time for thermal power plants. European coal producers 
feeling threatened quickly demand protection against foreign oil imports. They argue that high risk resides 
in the political instability of Middle East, jeopardising supply, transportation and prices altogether. Did 
domestic coal producers get any protection in the 1950s and 1960s from cheap foreign oil imports? 
In France, EDF had no obligation to use more coal than needed. It was easy given that France had few 
resources in coal compared to Germany and UK. Indeed, in the 1950s and 1960s, coal production reached 
100 million tons in Germany (133 million in 1957) and 200 million tons in UK (197 million in 1960), 
whereas France’s maximum production reached 59 million tons in 1958 and could never ensure 
selfsufficiency (National Coal Mining Museum n.d.; Office statistique des Communautés européennes 
n.d.). Moreover, marginalist economists (who did not take into account the supply risk) recommended 
reducing coal production in France and increase oil imports. 
Contrary to France, United Kingdom and Germany, who had relatively important resources in coal, took 
measures to protect domestic coal production. In the UK, the government created a tax on oil imports in 
1962, banned Russian oil and American coal imports, and from 1963-1964, imposed quantified coal use 
targets to CEGB (Chick, 2007). In Germany, such measures will occur later, after the oil shock, but are 
part of the same approach. 
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 To be more specific: 
- The risks related to operational costs and especially fuel costs were assessed by using past data: no changes in future trends were considered; 
- The risks related to investment costs were mainly due to construction risks associated with the land on which the plant was being built: it was 
considered as a mathematical expectation that was added to the investment cost as a security expense; 
- The risks related to financing programmes (volatility of public decisions) were identified but not taken into account; 
- The risks related to the expenses of financial compensation offered due to damages caused by plant construction gave us a first glimpse of the 
internalisation of externalities, but again no modelling was considered since it was too risky to be assessed. 
3
 The conflict occurred between Egypt and an alliance with Israël, France and  the United Kingdom, after the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egypt, the 
canal being a strategic step for oil imports. 
4
 Weisbrod, Arrow et Henry completed these theories in the 1960s and 1970s by addressing the issue of public decision in uncertain environment: Arrow 
(1965); Henry (1974); Weisbrod (1964). 
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e. From Peak oil to developing alternative technologies to oil 
After the two oil shocks in 1973 and 1979, a transitory period starts in Europe. In reaction to high oil 
prices, all countries take measures to reduce their dependency to black gold, including France that had not 
made this choice from the beginning. 
 A predictable effect of peak oil is the return to coal for some electricity producers. This happens mainly 
in Germany, where the Kohlpfennig is established in 1974: it is a tax on electricity consumption, used to 
support domestic coal. In 1977 the Jahrhundertvertrag (literally “the contract of the century”) makes it 
complulsory for power generators to get part of their supply from domestic coal producers. 
The search for substitutes then develops, being very different from one country to the other. For instance, 
the United Kingdom quickly starts to explore the North Sea for new fossile resources, like gas, while 
France invests massively in civil nuclear energy. 
 
Electro-nuclear program thus develop in France and Europe: their success or failure depend strongly on 
how national economies and companies resist to oil shocks, succeed in strategic and industrial nuclear 
deployment and manage public acceptance (or even public support). 
In France, the high cash flows of EDF allow limiting the impact of high oil prices on consumers 
(Francony, 1979). EDF also manages to have low financial costs for the building of its nuclear fleet. For 
purely economic reasons, the choice is made to go with the American Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) 
technology and buy the corresponding Westinghouse license in 1969 rather than French Graphite Gas 
Reactors developed by the French Commission for Atomic Energy (CEA). The French nuclear program 
(Plan Mesmer) is thus launched in 1974. 
The United Kingdom adopts the opposite approach. The nationally developed Advanced Gas Reactor 
(AGR) is chosen for the nuclear program (Grand and Veyrenc, 2011). However the program must then be 
abandoned in the middle of the 1980s for want of competitiveness. An alternative program based on the 
Westinghouse PWR technology is then launched in 1982 but will be abandoned again after the building of 
only one reactor in 1988 (Sizewell B) due to cuts in public budget and drifting costs. 
In Germany, the technologies chosen by the companies are Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR) and 
Boiling Water Reactors (BWR) developed loccaly by a Siemens subsidiary. Nuclear energy grows rapidly 
in Germany, although contested by the public from the start (which was not the case in France). 
Between 1980 and 1986, Italy builds only four reactors and Spain five. 
 
Besides, public acceptance of power generating technologies becomes more and more vital over the 
years. Local opposition for environment protection first focuses on coal, demanding that coal-fired plants 
were built outside cities. The phenomenon quickly reaches civil nuclear, in particular in Germany where 
the opposition to the building of a nuclear plant in Wyhl in the 1970s, successfully leading to abandoning 
the project in 1975, becomes an example for all anti-nuclear movements (Mills and Williams, 1986). 
The rejection of coal-fired plants by one part of European population is first addressed by the 
development of the first Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) in the United Kingdom in 1991. This 
technology allows building smaller facilities than coal and nuclear plants, but still ensuring high 
profitability. It will also be favored by the end of the Cold War (in the late 1980s) since it means direct 
access to abundant and cheap Russian gas - indeed Russia is in 1990 the first gas producer worldwide with 
629 billion m
3
 (Enerdata n.d.). Electricity producers using CCGT thus achieve competitiveness on the 
market thanks to accepted and moderate investment and thanks to cheap gas. 
Such new entrants stimulate competition on the electricity markets until then integrated or monopolistic. 
However, the liberal mutation of Europe regarding electricity is more due to a combination of theoretical 
breakthroughs and political decisions. 
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3. 1986-2012, from the process of European liberalization to climate change 
mitigation considerations: towards a mutation of electricity markets 
a. Theoretical questioning of natural monopolies 
In the aftermath of World War II, Cost-Benefis Analysis has shaped electricity investment choices in 
numerous European countries. It has stayed the major approach until the 1980s, although already 
theoretically contested in the 1960s. These works first question the efficiency of monopolistic and 
integrated model, and identify empirically their negative effects. First, a tendency to over-capitalize is 
revealed – it is the Averch-Johnson effect (1962)
5
; then the absence of competition also fails to encourage 
efficiency (Leibenstein, 1966). Besides, the relationship between the regulator and the electricity sector can 
lead to protect the interests of the monopoly rather than the interest of consumers (Buchanan, 1975); 
Peltzman, 1976; Stiglitz, 1976). 
This questioning goes further with Kahn, Baumol et Sharkey who address the issue of how to define a 
natural monopoly (Baumol, 1977; Kahn and Eads, 1971; Sharkey and Reid, 1983). According to these 
authors, in a grid sector such as the electricity sector, natural monopoly does not apply to the whole sector 
but only to activities related to grid management. Competition can thus be introduced in other activites of 
the sector, such as production and distribution, for the benefit of consumers. This argument is the one later 
raised by EU and is at the root of the liberalization process in grid industries.  
Last, in the 1990s, Laffont and Tirole (1993) emphasize these results by showing that a monopolistic 
company has an asymmetrical relationship with the regulator: the company’s interest is thus to take 
advantage of this situation regarding information on key points in order to increase their revenue. 
 
b. From the European Coal and Steel Community to the Directive relative to internal 
electricity market 
With the political construction of EU initiated in the 1950s, several European Communities for trade and 
economy are created. These communities lead in 1986 to the Single European Act and in 1996 to the 
creation of a single European electricity market – or rather to the creation of such an objective – thanks to 
the EU Directive on common rules for the internal market in electricity.  
The United Kingdom was considered as a model for this market reform, since it was chronologically 
speaking the first European country to experience electricity market liberalization (Glachant, 2000). 
The creation of an internal market in Europe has two goals. First, competition is expected to lower 
electricity prices for the consumers. Second, a European market allows to broaden the perimeter for 
resources in order to have better system optimization (Grand and Veyrenc, 2011). In practice, the reform 
allows member states to choose whatever measures they see fit to meet the objectives. They can either 
open the market to new entrants, either stop controlling prices, either create an independant regulator for 
every activity open to competition, etc. (Newbery, 1997; Perrot, 2002). 
Given the heterogeneity of insitutions, markets and industries in differents European countries and given 
also the flexibility of European Commission Directives, results end up being very heterogenous. 
 
This liberalization can first be assessed through the market concentration index:  Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI)
6
. Market concentration is often used to evaluate the degree of competition (we shall discuss 
this assertion later). Table 1 sums up the HHI of the five countries studied in this article.
7
  
 
  
                                                            
5
 This effect measures the tendency of companies to engage in excessive capital accumulation in order to increase the volume of their profit. 
6
 The HHI index is the sum of the squares of market shares of N the companies present on the market:  
 
si represents the market share of the firm i in the market, and N the number of firms.The lower HHI is, the less the market is concentrated, and the higher 
HHI is, the more the market is concentrated. 
7
 Indexes were calculated for year 2010 using Eurostat data and European power companies’ annual reports (own calculus). 
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 France Germany Italy Spain United 
Kingdom 
HHI 7651 1354 943 1139 878 
 
Table 1: HHI per country, own calculus. 
 
Two groups are to be distinguished at first glance. On the one hand, France stands alone with a very high 
HHI equal to 7651, which indicates a very concentrated market. On the other hand, the four other contries 
under study have HHI between 878 and 1354 and reflect contrasted situations, from not concentrated 
(>1000) to concentrated markets (<1000).8 
Today, the British market has an HHI of 878 and is thus acknowledged as competitive. This result can be 
explained by an institutional approach (Glachant, 2000) since, to achieve liberalization, some institutional 
configurations seem more favorable than others. This is why quick changes are easier to realize for very 
integrated companies or monopolies than for a group of several private decentralized companies. A state in 
which the government has a strong influence on legislation, rather than a federal state such as Germany, 
also is quicker to make decisions that will affect the whole country. Such an institutional combination is 
thus considered ideal and corresponds to the profile of United Kingdom: CEGB is a national integrated 
company, in an institutional environment staging a strong government.  
 
It is though important to notice that HH Index has srong limits when it comes to describe a company’s 
market power, since it does not take into account the different kinds of companies (private/public) nor the 
demand elasticity, neither the threat of potential substitute (Borenstein, Bushnell and Knittel, 1999). The 
electricity market thus has several characteristics that are not correctly represented by this concentration 
index. There are indeed different kinds of power generation companies (public firms, natural monopolies, 
private companies, etc.) who are likely to react differently in the same competition environment. Besides, 
electricity is a nessary commodity, but non-storable, with a pretty non-elastic demand obeying regular 
seasonal and hourly variations. Moreover, due to technical constraints, the ability of a producer to take a 
market share to another one is highly dependent on transmission facilities and existing grid, but also on 
base generation. HHI can also indicate the current repartition of power generation facilities in the 
company, but not the prices movements, neither the quality of delivered power. 
 
c. The United Kingdom (HHI < 1000): a model for electricity sector liberalization? 
The United Kingdom was historically the first country in Europe to deregulate its market from the mid-
1980s, together with the United States of America on an international level. Today, we can take stock of 
the first results of this deregulation. The picture is a mixed one. Clearly, British deregulation has followed 
a specific process by starting from an integrated industry:  
- Sorting of power plants according to technologies: British Energy got in charge of nuclear power 
plants and Centrica of others. British Energy historically stayed into generation without engaging 
into downstream activities. The selling activity focused on a few big clients (companies), the rest of 
its generation being supplied through independent marketers; 
- Opening of the market to competition on different aspects of the value chain: generation and 
distribution; 
- Grid networks have a mixed regime: they are regulated but they are allowed to be owned by actors 
of the competitive market. 
What are the key constants to this day? The price of electricity is rather high compared on a European 
scale: 11.39 c€/kWh in UK against 7.71 c€/kWh in France (industry prices for 2013, Eurostat). Moreover, 
the electricity fleet is moving towards undersizing. It is now assessed that given the current pace of 
demand evolution and planned phasing out and building of power plants, the United Kingdom will not be 
                                                            
8
 Selon les lignes directrices de la Commission européenne sur la concurrence, un marché dans lequel le HHI est inférieur à 1000 est compétitif et peu 
concentré, alors que le marché dans lequel un HHI est supérieur à 2000 est très concentré et donc pas compétitif. 
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able to meet domestic demand – the planned phase outs being more reliable than planned constructions 
(Energy UK, 2013). 
What are the factors explaining the situation? Let us first note that both factors are strongly correlated: 
when capacities decrease, prices should increase. Such prices can thus be explained by the relative 
decrease in supply capacities (compared to consumption). Today, power generators have to face a volatile 
market in a country where the main fuel for power generation is gas - 46% of generation, inherited from 
the North Sea resources. Gas prices rose during this period and since electricity prices are strongly 
correlated to gas prices due to substitution effect, electricity prices followed. An important volatility in 
prices came along with this rise. This volatility introduces important risks for wholesale electricity prices. 
Such uncertainty induces obvious risks for an investor regarding the decision to build new power plants. 
This risk affects the financing cost of new power plants, which is not always provided by wholesale market 
marginal cost pricing when it comes to peak capacities. The ability to cover investments thanks to market 
mechanisms thus seems limited: as a result, the market moves towards a reduction of installed capacity. 
The issue of financing of new capacities is endemic to electricity market deregulation, since the required 
amounts for baseload power plants are high. One can reasonably assume that peak fuels volatility is not 
going to disappear. Besides, the British case also reminds that whereas the multiplication of supply sources 
is a sine qua none condition for competition, it does not automatically triggers the sink of prices. Today 
competition is intense between distribution actors who buy electricity from the producers. If the margin of 
these distributors is with no doubt submitted to high pressure due to competition, it does not affect most of 
costs, since they depend on power plants and grids, the capacities of plants declining. Fares could decrease 
or at least be competitive on the Bristish market when supply will be sufficient in terms of available 
capacities and performing compared to other European countries (i.e. compared to prices obtained with 
average costs pricing). 
Is it though a reason to refute electricity markets deregulation? The question often ignores one the key 
contribution of market liberalization: financing of new power plants and grids is now private and not 
public, which protects the taxpayer from unprofitable investments. As a counterpart, investors are more 
reluctant to finance the building of new power plants… Liberalization certainly needs to evolve in order to 
take into account the necessity of ensuring investments in new capacities. Today, the United Kingdom 
seems to have to interfere directly on the market to ensure the necessary electricity investments. The 2013 
agreement between the British government and French company EDF for the building of two Evolutionary 
Power Reactor (EPR) is a strong example (Department of Energy & Climate Change and Prime Minister’s 
Office, 2013). 
 
The liberalization of the Italian electricity market has also delivered visible results pretty quickly. The 
Italian state being favorable to liberalization from the start, it quickly auctioned part of the assets of 
historical oligopolies in order to favor new entrants. HHI of Italian electricity market is now 943. It is, with 
UK’s HHI, the lowest among the considered countries. However, the importance of power company Enel 
on the Italian stage (28% of national generation) as well as the international stage shows that there is still a 
strong national champion; which is not the case in the UK. Electricity price in Italy reaches 11.22 c€/kWh 
in 2013 (same sources). 
 
d. Germany (2000 > HHI > 1000): liberalized electricity? 
The global attitude of Germany towards liberalization seemed favorable at first, but the process quickly 
introduced a reinforcement of state control over electricity operators, who were formerly used to auto-
regulation. The market is still moderately concentrated with an HHI above 1000 and equal to 1354. 
The current structure of the German electricity market is dominated by four companies: E.On and RWE 
ensuring 60% of generation
9
; Vattenfall and EnBW 20%. The relative failure of electricity market 
liberalization in Germany can be partially attributed to German state’s will to protect the volume of 
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 E.on and RWE are historically multi-utilities and are very present on the gas market as well as the electricity market. 
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national electricity generation. The German electricity market has prices lower than the ones in UK, but 
higher than in France (8.6 c€/kWh in Germany vs 7.71c€/kWh in France). While Germany has abundant 
coal resources and coal is the cheapest fuel today, this higher price in Germany can be explained by strong 
penetration of renewables and high taxes on electricity prices. 
 
Spain has adopted an attitude similar to Germany’s: state control on prices, protection of historical 
operators (Endesa and Iberdrola) and strong support of renewables. HHI is equal to 1139, which describes 
a moderately concentrated market. Electricity prices reach 11.65 c€/kWh maingly for want of local 
resources. 
 
e. France (HHI > 7000): an electricity market with no competition between actors but yet 
offering competitive prices 
France is the country where liberalization was the less successful: there is one main operator regularly 
supported by French state policy in its application of European directives (the December 2010 NOME law 
for “Nouvelle Organisation du Marché de l'Électricité”). French HHI is equal to 7651, which is very 
concentrated and makes France a rather special case in the EU landscape. Of course, the fact that 75% of 
generation relies on nuclear can explain part of it. France thus avoided some of the mistakes of the 
integrated model. It did not protect coal in the 1960s when it was not competitive compared to oil, and 
chose in the 1970s the most profitable nuclear technology even though it was not the one developed 
nationally. 
France is in a paradoxical situation: EDF is a largely integrated quasi-monopoly but electricity is one of 
the cheapest in EU. Under these conditions, one can legitimately question the opportunity to reform the 
French market and the need to break a monopoly ensuring more competitive prices than mupltiple actors in 
competition. 
Two additional questions remain regarding the future of the French market. First, the financing cost of 
nuclear power plants (for addition or renewing of capacities): according to the two latest CEOs of EDF, the 
current price of electricity does not allow financing of the fleet renewing. Second, is competition possible 
with a monopoly in possession of a rent (difference between marginal costs of nuclear and other generation 
technologies)? And if it is desirable, should an artifact be used to implement it? 
In France, the situation is thus atypical in the European landscape, since EDF owns the quasi-totality of 
generation capacities and 100% of baseload capacities through its nuclear power plants. The NOME law 
tried to open the market to competitors by giving them regulated access to historical nuclear electricity 
(ARENH). In the end, the relatively high price fixed by the government for entrants to buy this electricity 
seems profitable to EDF. 
 
f. New stakes in climate change and renewables: back to centralized policy for the 
electricity sector?  
Environmental concerns growed the past decades with the creation of Intergovernmental Panel for 
Climate Change in 1988, the signature of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, or the Stern Report (Stern 2006, 
2007). They leaded Europe to develop an ambitious plan for energy and climate: the Climat and Energy 
Package defined by the European Commission (2009a; b; c)
10
. New economic incentives can thus be 
expected to be put at use such as carbon tax or subsidies for research in renewables, in order to complete 
existing tools like the European Union Emission Trading System, and reinforcing the role of states in 
energy and electricity markets. 
Regarding renewables, the need for investments coordination through new regulation is vivid in all 
European countries. The share of renewables is indeed growing in all generation mix over Europe, which 
raises several technical and economic issues (upon wich we will come back later). This new policy also 
includes societal issues. First, it will have to occur in spite of public’s reluctance to more levies in time of 
                                                            
10
 It plans cutting greenhouse gas emission in 2020 (-20 % compared with 1990), increasing energy efficiency (+20 % more than business-as-usual 
projections for 2020) and objectives regarding the generation mix (20% renewable energies in the mix). 
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crisis. The fact that such levies could be redeployed, though theoretically viable, has little chances to be 
heard from a political point of view. This new policy will also have to face the recent rise in coal use (and 
the associated GHG emissions) occurring in countries reducing the share of nuclear in their mix (mainly 
Germany). 
From an economic point a view, it is difficult to find a unified theory allowing to determine optimal 
pricing and optimal investment amount when renewables are rising (OECD and Nuclear Energy Agency, 
2012). This rise indeed makes theories on optimal investment faulty for two reasons. First, incentives such 
as carbon tax, feed-in tariffs or green certificates distort the data for traditionnel models based on cost 
minimization issue from Massé’s works. Such models structure costs in fixed costs (investments) and 
variable costs (operation and maintenance, and fuel). Ramsey-Boiteux optimal pricing is based on marginal 
costs and fixes investments from them. However, for unavoidable renewable energies, the variable cost is 
quasi-zero, so the marginal cost is also zero, which does not allow optimal pricing nor adequate price 
signal for investments. Besides, the fact that recent renewable technologies (wind, solar) are both 
unpredictable and intermittent are not yet correctly taken into account in existing models and are still under 
research. In reality, unpredictability and intermittence of renewable make it necessary to deploy demand 
response tools in order to compensate drops in generation like back-up gas-fired plants, and to develop 
interconnected grids on larger distances to take advantage of the geographical dispersion of renewables. 
Such heavy investments are only starting to be negociated or deployed in a few areas of Europe (like 
Scandinavian countries). For instance, models taking into account these new aspects in electricity fleet 
modeling are being developed: model MAEL (Dautremont and Colle, 2013), model MIXOPTIM (Bonin et 
al., 2013), the one developed by Bossmann, Pfluger and Wietschel (2013), etc. 
 
4. Conclusion: towards restructuring of European generation mix? 
We have conducted an analysis of drivers for electricity investments and of how these drivers have 
evolved over the six past decades. We thus have seen that a state’s policy can follow standard economic 
theory like Cost-Benefit Analysis11 of the one of Natural Monopoles, but mostly tends to be shaped by 
purely political and internal considerations. Today, electricity investment have to be undertaken under the 
frame of electricity markets liberalization, which was triggered by new theories at the times (Averch and 
Johnson, 1962; Leibenstein, 1966); Buchanan, 1975; Peltzman, 1976; Stiglitz, 1976; Baumol, 1977; Kahn 
and Eads, 1971; Sharkey and Reid, 1983; Laffont and Tirole, 1993). 
The phenomenon of liberalization nevertheless bumps now into several hurdles. First, one has but to 
observe that electricity prices in Europe have not sinked but risen since the beginning of the process. 
Among the five countries under study, electricity prices for industry have on average grown from 6.31 
c€/kWh in 2002 to 9.91 c€/kWh in 2013
12
 (source: Eurostat). Critical situations in terms of electricity 
generation are also to be noted like in the United Kingdom. Besides electricity markets can stay little 
competitive and very concentrated due to peculiar institutional reasons (Germany, France) that can as well 
stem from a certain economic rationality. 
Last, the need to mitigate GHG emissions and to increase the share of renewable in the mix makes the 
intervention of states and EU necessary to set up new regulations regarding energy choices and 
investments. This re-regulation proves nevertheless very different from the centralized driving Europe 
used to know until the middle of the 1980s. Indeed, it does not question the foundations of liberalization, 
but still consists in pretty strong market control through fiscal and economic tools. 
We could not close this article without evoking one additional driver – the weight of which regarding 
investment decisions that should keep growing: the acceptance of electricity generation technologies by the 
European public, especially regarding nuclear power plants. Ever since the Fukushima accident in Japan in 
2011 on March 11, and given the influence it has already had on some of the decisions of European 
                                                            
11
 For instance in France with nuclear investment: the choice was made of the most economically competitive technology even if it was a « foreign » 
technology (an American one). 
12
 To be more accurate: from 6.14 to 11.39 c€/kWh in United Kingdom; from 5.62 to 7.71c€/kWh in France; from 6.85 to 8.60 c€/kWh in Germany; from 
5.20 to 11.6 c€/kWh in Spain; from 7.76 to 11.22c€/kWh in Italy. 
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countries, this parameter cannot be neglected anymore. Nuclear phase out in Germany, Italy, and 
Switzerland is all the more important that it can have unexpected but major politicial impacts on 
neighboring countries. 
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